The pre-eminence of Thought as a tool in Moral Science

Reclaiming the ‘science’ in Moral Science

That which is judged right may not seem moral, what is right and moral may not appear just. In theory, perhaps, the categories can be strictly defined and delineated. But ground realities are often nebulous and categorisation is not unanimous because events dovetail each other in the process of being and becoming, skewing perception. Therefore, it is both difficult and delusory to evaluate any incident in isolation and to arrive at a conclusion regarding the nature of the individual/s involved. Even primary evidence and first-hand experience can be considered to provide pointers at best as even considered perceptions come to be seen as subjective over space and time. Conclusions that are outcomes of intense and comprehensive deliberations have also been known to fall short of universal acceptance.

Therefore, attention to what is happening – both on the surface and behind it or below it, consideration of the  overt motivations and covert stimuli – imbibed naturally, mechanically or consciously, introspecting on the nature of the requisite response – including the negation of one, and contemplating on the episode in toto each becomes a process of thought.  Using the tools of Moral Science thus far discussed – the Moral Scale, the Moral Mirror, and the Moral Imprint – also involves thinking deliberately. The Science of Morals, therefore, makes it incumbent on us to educate ourselves to use Thought as a tool and to become skilled in using it instinctively.

[This is an episodic essay. There’s more to come…]

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